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ABSTRACT 
Recently, critics of the administrative state have been urging Congress 
to reassert itself and rein in regulatory action that they maintain is 
both undesirable as a matter of policy and in violation of 
constitutional principles. This anti-regulatory position is 
unwarranted. While regulatory agencies have indeed been more 
active in recent decades—in part due to increasing gridlock in 
Congress—the resulting regulatory actions produced large net 
benefits to the American people and were carried out pursuant to 
authority delegated by Congress and reviewed by the courts. By 
contrast, more robust action by Congress, as long as Congress 
continues to exhibit its current pathologies, is unlikely to be beneficial. 
Furthermore, in a troubling development, the Trump Administration 
has turned away from cost-benefit analysis in order to carry out its 
anti-regulatory agenda, disregarding an established bipartisan 
consensus that stretched back several decades.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, critics of the regulatory state have 
complained that an out-of-control executive branch has harmed the 
American people and the American economy, and that Congress needs 
to reassert itself and constrain this misbehavior.1 Though criticism of 
executive branch agencies is certainly not a new development in 
American political debate, historically critics often demanded stronger 
presidential control of the administrative state.2 Recently, however, 
with increasing concern from both the right and the left about the 
expanding power of the president, the tenor of anti-regulatory attacks 
has shifted to call on Congress to step up and rein in the “Executive,” 
more broadly defined to include the president as well as agencies.3 
                                                   
 1. See F. H. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING: THE RISE OF CROWN 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 12-13 (2015) (arguing that the accumulation and 
centralization of power under the president threatens the American constitutional 
system); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 31 (2014) 
(arguing that administrative lawmaking represents a form of extralegal governance 
fundamentally at odds with the U.S. constitutional scheme); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s 
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (framing 
the recent criticism of the administrative state in the context of attacks on the New 
Deal); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of 
Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 46-47 (highlighting the parallels drawn 
in modern critiques of the executive power and the administrative state to the 
despotism and lawlessness of the Stuart kings); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation 
Running Riot, 1 REG. 83, 83-84 (1995) (citing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER 
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION (1993)) (arguing that the New Deal had “banished . . . the Constitution 
of liberty”). 
 2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural 
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165-66 
(1992) (summarizing arguments for the “unitary executive” theory of stronger 
presidential control of the executive branch); Metzger, supra note 1, at 32 (comparing 
recent “alarms about burgeoning presidential power” to Reagan-era attacks of 
“restrictions on presidential authority”); Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative 
over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan 
Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 628-
29 (1989) (observing that President Reagan was unable to achieve his deregulatory 
goals through legislation and instead turned to “aggressive administrative strategy,” 
including centralized oversight of agencies). 
 3. See BUCKLEY, supra note 1, at 152-57 (alleging that administrative 
rulemaking works to consolidate power in the president at the expense of Congress); 
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that the so-called Constitution-in-
Exile Movement is a “wholesale critique of modern exercises of administrative 
power,” though the movement is “broad and ill-defined”). Sunstein and Vermeule also 
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Calls for Congress to wield more control over the executive branch 
grew louder during the Obama presidency, when Republicans in 
Congress sought ways to challenge a Democrat in the White House.4 
However, the criticism—of the administrative state and, less 
vigorously, of the role of the president—continues under the Trump 
Administration, despite Republican control of the White House and 
both houses of Congress.5 
I disagree with both the diagnosis of the illness—that the 
regulatory state is out of control—and the cure—that Congress needs 
to exercise firmer oversight over the executive branch. Though 
separation of powers concerns have also been hotly debated in recent 
years regarding presidential action on foreign policy, war-making, and 
homeland security,6 my focus in this piece is on regulatory policy. 
                                                   
note a related thread of criticism from the left towards executive power arising during 
the George W. Bush Administration regarding Guantanamo Bay and the Patriot Act. 
See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 46.  
 4. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of 
Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 832-35 (2011) (describing the rise of the 
Tea Party as a popular, constitutional movement responding to President Obama’s 
policies). Obama’s presidency, from 2009 to 2016, coincided—not incidentally—
with a period of heated debate around the constitutional place of the administrative 
state. See infra Part II (noting that Obama tried to implement policies through 
regulation in light of the gridlock in Congress). 
 5. Congress is still considering regulatory reform bills, such as the 
Regulatory Accountability Act and the Regulations from the Executive in Need of 
Scrutiny Act, which would significantly curtail the president’s power to control the 
administrative state. See Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 631 (2017) (highlighting that Republican calls 
for regulatory reform have not disappeared during the Trump Administration); Philip 
A. Wallach, The Ironic Politics of Regulatory Reform, BROOKINGS (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-ironic-politics-of-regulatory-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/APK3-7R3B] (describing the political dynamics of support for the 
Regulatory Accountability Act, which would constrain the Trump Administration, but 
enjoys support from Republicans but not Democrats); Philip A. Wallach & Nicholas 
W. Zeppos, Will Congress and President Trump Be Collaborators or Combatants on 
Regulatory Reform?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/will-congress-and-president-trump-be-collaborators-or-combatants-on-
regulatory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/K9KY-YMPV] (questioning whether Trump 
will support reforms to the administrative state that would give Congress more power 
at the expense of the executive branch). Though legislation is still on the table, 
Republicans have been less outspoken in criticizing President Trump’s role in 
overseeing the administrative state than they were of President Obama’s. See Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Republicans Discover the Mythical Basis for Regulatory Reform, REG. 
REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/ 
2018/01/30/pierce-republicans-mythical-basis-regulatory-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/G3NN-6RCJ] (noting that proposals for reform of the rulemaking 
process have “all but vanished” from Republicans’ agenda since Trump took office). 
 6. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 
1029, 1030-31 (2004) (reconsidering the president’s emergency powers in the face of 
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And, within the domain of regulatory policy, my focus is on 
environmental regulation, particularly regulation under the Clean Air 
Act, where the benefits and costs of regulation are highest,7 and the 
vitriol of regulatory opponents has been especially pronounced.8 
The criticism of the regulatory state breaks down into five 
propositions: first, that Congress is paralyzed by gridlock; second, that 
the executive branch has stepped into the breach; third, that this result 
is undesirable as a matter of policy; fourth, that it is an affront to our 
                                                   
the threat of terrorism); Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the 
Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
447, 450 (2011) (arguing that the Iraq War “represented a breathtaking assertion of 
presidential authority to redefine war aims without the consent of Congress”); Daphne 
Barak-Erez, Terrorism Law Between the Executive and Legislative Models, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 877, 878-79 (2009) (noting examples of executive actions on anti-terrorism 
taken by President Obama that cut out Congress); Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal 
Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International 
Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1415-21 (2002) (discussing 
constitutional implications of executive action on detentions and military 
tribunals); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying 
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002) (arguing that President 
Bush’s order that established military tribunals, which were not authorized by 
Congress, was “flatly unconstitutional”); Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the 
“Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure after September 
11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 388 (2004) (advocating for an approach to emergency 
powers that “allocate[s] the risk of uncertainty that crisis yields between the three 
branches”). 
 7. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM 
ACT 12 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ 
draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8SE-82TY] (finding EPA 
regulations to constitute over 80% of monetized benefits and over 70% of monetized 
costs of major federal regulations). 
 8. See Coral Davenport, EPA: The World in Microcosm, NAT’L J. (Sept. 22, 
2011) [hereinafter The World in Microcosm] (describing the EPA as the “the poster 
child for expanded government control”); Coral Davenport, E.P.A Faces Bigger 
Tasks, Smaller Budgets and Louder Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/us/politics/epa-faces-bigger-tasks-smaller-
budgets-and-louder-critics.html [https://perma.cc/HB4Q-3DJF] (describing the EPA 
as a “favorite political target for Republicans”); Stephen Power, Environment Chief 
Caught in the Campaign Crossfire, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2010), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704847104575532243548950392 
[https://perma.cc/88ZQ-QSK5] (highlighting that Tea Party candidates in 2010 
blamed many of the country’s problems on environmental regulation); Cristine 
Russell, Bill Ruckelshaus on EPA: ‘Battered Agency Syndrome?’, ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 
2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/12/bill-ruckelshaus-on-
epa-battered-agency-syndrome/67501/ [https://perma.cc/FY8L-BDPF] (describing 
EPA as “a lightning rod for the anti-government fervor that strikes Washington on a 
regular basis”). 
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constitutional system of separation of powers; and, fifth, that to solve 
this problem, Congress should assert greater control over 
administrative agencies. I agree with the first two propositions, 
disagree with the next three, and have a deep concern about a recent, 
related turn of events: the Trump Administration’s turn away from 
cost-benefit analysis as an organizing principle for the administrative 
state. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL GRIDLOCK 
On the first proposition, there is a general consensus in the 
academic literature9 and in the media10 that Congress has become 
increasingly gridlocked in recent years. Though commentators take 
                                                   
 9. See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE 
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE 
NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 101 (2012) (arguing that “[t]he single-minded focus on 
scoring political points over solving problems . . . has reached a level of such intensity 
and bitterness that the government seems incapable of taking and sustaining public 
decisions responsive to the existential challenges facing the country”); SARAH 
BINDER, POLARIZED WE GOVERN? 11-16 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedTextRevTableRev
.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4Y4-8KGV] (demonstrating a trend of increasing 
congressional gridlock since the mid-twentieth century); Joseph P. Tomain, Gridlock, 
Lobbying, and Democracy, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 87, 89 (2017) (observing 
that the prevalence of micro-level gridlock is “a standstill between wealthy corporate 
interests with political access and the rest of America”); Barbara Sinclair, Is Congress 
Now the Broken Branch?, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 703, 704 (noting that recent 
developments raise concerns “about the contemporary Congress’s capacity to 
adequately perform its central functions”). 
 10. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens 
in Congress, Only Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/R2S7-8PV4] (discussing the past and potential future 
governmental shutdowns during the Trump presidency); Chris Cillizza, The Least 
Productive Congress Ever, WASH. POST (July 17, 2013),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/17/the-least-productive-
congress-ever/ [https://perma.cc/8J6A-5PAT] (pointing out that the 112th Congress 
(2011-2012) had passed fewer bills than any Congress since 1947 when the statistic 
started being tracked); Toluse Olorunnipa, Trump’s Governing Just Like Obama with 
Congress Gridlocked, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-03/trump-s-pen-and-phone-
presidency-begins-as-congress-gridlocks [https://perma.cc/HK8G-YYTL] (noting 
that President Trump has become frustrated with congressional inactivity and is 
relying on executive power to try to make progress on his agenda); David Faris, Why 
the GOP Congress Will Be the Most Unproductive in 164 Years, WEEK (July 18, 
2017), http://theweek.com/articles/711503/why-gop-congress-most-unproductive- 
164-years [https://perma.cc/8QXS-BEDD] (attributing gridlock to polarization 
between parties and within the Republican party). 
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different approaches to measuring gridlock,11 many consider some 
measure of legislative output to gauge legislative productivity and, by 
implication, gridlock.12 Though the most straightforward approach to 
measuring legislative output is to compare numbers of bills passed or 
the page-length of bills passed across Congresses, these statistics may 
be misleading as not all bills are equally significant, and not all 
Congresses have equally urgent legislative agendas.13 Additionally, 
gridlock is generally defined as a failure of Congress to make 
substantive policy decisions, so lack of legislative productivity is not 
a perfect proxy: A decision by Congress to maintain the status quo is 
not an example of gridlock, though that decision might result in no 
legislative output.14  
One oft-cited study of gridlock considers the percentage of the 
“salient” legislative items—defined as those items that are covered in 
at least four editorials in The New York Times—that failed to pass.15 
According to a recent study, under this measure, the 112th Congress 
(2011–2012) was one of the two least productive Congresses between 
1947 and 2012, failing to pass 71% of salient legislative items on its 
agenda.16 More generally, the study found an upward trend in gridlock 
with the trendline nearly doubling from about 30% of salient 
legislative items gridlocked in the mid-twentieth century to almost 
60% gridlocked in 2012.17 The concern about congressional gridlock 
has not abated during the Trump presidency, despite Republicans 
controlling both houses of Congress and the presidency.18 
Signs of gridlock can be observed beyond strict legislative 
output as well. Congressional scholar Barbara Sinclair has pointed to 
the rise in the use of “unorthodox” congressional procedures—such as 
omnibus bills, post-committee adjustments, and changes in 
parliamentary rules—as a symptom of worsening gridlock.19 These 
                                                   
 11. Professor Teter describes congressional gridlock as having “a ‘know it 
when you see it’ feel.” Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to 
Separation of Powers, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1102. 
 12. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY 
CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002 (2d ed. 2005) (attempting 
to rigorously quantify congressional gridlock for the first time). 
 13. See Teter, supra note 11, at 1105. 
 14. See id. at 1102-03, 1102 n.17. 
 15. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 5 n.2, 8-9. The methodology of the study is 
designed to control for the size of a given Congress’s legislative agenda rather than 
merely counting total bills or total pages of bills with no filter. See id. 
 16. See id. at fig.3. 
 17. See id.  
 18. See Stolberg & Fandos, supra note 10. 
 19. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 235 (2d ed. 2000); see also Abbe R. Gluck, 
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less-formal procedures decrease deliberation and transparency in the 
lawmaking process, but, given the difficulty Congress has in passing 
any laws during periods of gridlock, cutting procedural corners 
appears to be the only way for Congress to get anything at all done.20 
In a similar vein, in the Senate, the increased use of filibusters and the 
cloture rule supports the conclusion of worsening gridlock.21 From 
1917, when the cloture rule was first adopted, to 1988, a total of 385 
motions to invoke cloture were filed; that number was surpassed in 
just a six-year span from 2007 to 2013 with 391 cloture motions.22 
Where filibusters used to be relatively rare, they have now become a 
key weapon in the arsenal of a minority party trying to obstruct 
potential legislation.23 
Various factors have been suggested to explain the current 
extreme levels of congressional gridlock.24 For example, an increase 
in the frequency of divided government could lead to more periods in 
which Congress expects to be less productive and focuses more on 
obstruction than on trying to compromise on passing legislation.25 
More extreme polarization between congressional members of 
different parties, with fewer moderates in Congress, means that 
reaching across the aisle to build consensus to pass legislation is less 
likely to be fruitful.26 Also, congressional districts are becoming less 
                                                   
Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of 
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 76 (2015) (describing the Affordable 
Care Act as “a textbook example of the modern trend toward nontextbook, or 
‘unorthodox,’ lawmaking”). 
 20. See SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 235. 
 21. See id. at 107. 
 22. See Teter, supra note 11, at 1107. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 26-28) (on file with author) (explaining various 
reasons for gridlock).  
 25. See id. at 26-27; see also Fang-Yi Chiou & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 
When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 503, 518 (2003); 
Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 519, 530 (1999); John J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, 
and Party Responsiveness, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 821, 825-26, 832 (1999). 
 26. See Brian F. Schaffner, Party Polarization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 527, 539 (Eric Schickler & Frances E. Lee eds., 2011) 
(describing studies that have connected polarization and gridlock); Daryl J. Levinson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 
2338 (2006) (arguing that “cohesive and polarized parties” can help explain the 
current dynamics in Congress); Revesz, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that gridlock 
tends to increase when there are fewer moderates in Congress); Sinclair, supra note 
9, at 716 (noting that compromise is less likely where there are greater differences 
between preferences of the two major parties). Some scholars have noted, however, 
that polarization alone does not invariably lead to gridlock. See, e.g., Richard H. 
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competitive between the parties, in part due to gerrymandering.27 As a 
result, instead of facing a threat from a candidate of the other party, 
members of Congress may be more likely to face serious opposition 
in a primary challenge from a more ideologically extreme candidate 
within their own party, making compromise across the aisle less 
helpful in elections than ideological purity.28 At the same time, the 
polarized media landscape helps push voters’ views to the extremes.29 
And, finally, with the amount of money flowing into politics today, 
politicians may feel their hands are tied on issues that are salient to 
their biggest donors, making those politicians unwilling to seek 
compromise.30 
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTIVITY 
On the second proposition—that the executive branch has tried 
to fill the void cause by congressional gridlock—it is fair to say that 
the Obama Administration ushered in a healthy dose of regulatory 
activity.31 Running for president in the midst of an economic recession 
                                                   
Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of 
American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 809-10 (2015) (describing how the 
American party system looks increasingly like a parliamentary party system, which is 
ineffective without strong power and leadership within the parties). 
 27. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 46; Thomas E. Mann, Polarizing 
the House of Representatives: How Much Does Gerrymandering Matter?, in 1 RED 
AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED 
POLITICS 263, 268-69 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006); Levinson & 
Pildes, supra note 26, at 2335; Revesz, supra note 24, at 27. 
 28. See Mann, supra note 27, at 267; Revesz, supra note 24, at 27-28; 
Schaffner, supra note 26, at 535; Thomas Stratmann, Congressional Voting over 
Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints, 94 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 665, 672 (2000). 
 29. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 58; BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY 
WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 63-64 (2006); 
Nicholas T. Davis & Johanna L. Dunaway, Party Polarization, Media Choice, and 
Mass Partisan-Ideological Sorting, 80 PUB. OPINION Q. 272, 292 (2016); Revesz, 
supra note 24, at 28; Daniel F. Stone, Media and Gridlock, 101 J. PUB. ECON. 94, 101 
(2013). 
 30. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 80; Ruben J. Garcia, Politics at 
Work after Citizens United, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016); Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Don’t Be So Impatient, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157, 2160 n.16 (2013); Revesz, 
supra note 24, at 28; Ray La Raja, The Supreme Court Might Strike Down Overall 
Contribution Limits. And That’s Okay., WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/10/09/the-supreme-
court-might-strike-down-overall-contribution-limits-and-thats-
okay/?utm_term=.f4716b9a9447 [https://perma.cc/SC86-KNEQ]. 
 31. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Obama Threw the Regulatory Engine into 
Overdrive. Trump Is Slowing it Down, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/04/25/obama-threw-regulatory-engine-
 Congress and the Executive 803 
in 2008, then-candidate Obama placed much of the blame for the 
recession on the deregulation of the financial sector that had occurred 
in the preceding decades.32 In one speech, criticizing the deregulatory 
policies of previous administrations, he proclaimed: “Instead of 
establishing a 21st century regulatory framework, we simply 
dismantled the old one . . . .”33 The open rhetorical embrace of 
regulation marked a stark contrast to the politics of the 1990s and the 
earlier 2000s, where both parties had tried to cut back or streamline 
federal regulation.34 
Though financial regulation and efforts to promote economic 
recovery captured a lot of attention in Obama’s first term, the 
administration was broadly aggressive in promulgating new rules and 
enforcing existing ones, with the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) being one of the most aggressive actors advancing this new 
                                                   
into-overdrive-trump-slowing-down/jKEXwmsieAhCUK7Vf2IiEO/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KY4T-G7A7] (noting that as a presidential candidate in 2008, 
Obama blamed deregulation for the economic crisis and vowed to regulate more 
actively); Eric Lipton, With Obama, Regulations Are Back in Fashion, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 12, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/us/politics/13rules.html? 
_r=2&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/S2N3-YLHR] (explaining that the Obama 
Administration had not only been aggressive in promulgating new rules but also in 
stepping up enforcement or rules); Susan E. Dudley & Daniel R. Pérez, President’s 
State of the Union Suggests Final Regulatory Push, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2016, 12:00 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2016/01/13/presidents-state-of-the-
union-suggests-final-regulatory-push/#2c002d4279b2 [https://perma.cc/X65Z-
JNXU] (highlighting that the Obama Administration had outpaced the Clinton and 
both Bush Administrations in the number of economically significant regulations); 
Daniel R. Pérez, President Obama’s Regulatory Output: Looking Back at 2015 and 
Ahead to 2016, GEO. WASH. UNIV. REG. STUD. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2016), 
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/president-obama’s-regulatory-output-
looking-back-2015-and-ahead-2016 [https://perma.cc/2Y7Y-KANG] (demonstrating 
that the Obama Administration enacted more economically significant regulations in 
2015 than had been passed in the second to last year in the Clinton and George W. 
Bush Administrations). Though the methodological challenges in measuring levels of 
regulation are beyond the scope of this Article, the regulatory efforts of the Obama 
Administration are generally deemed to have been more vigorous than those of its 
recent predecessors. See Lipton, supra.  
 32. See Michael Powell, Obama Urges Regulation in Wake of Housing 
Slump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/ 
us/politics/27cnd-dems.html?ex=1364356800&en=1f7f7529c7cec326&ei=5088& 
partner=rssnyt&emc=rss [https://perma.cc/YJ5E-BHVN]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See James Ridgeway, It’s the Deregulation, Stupid, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 
28, 2008, 7:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/its-deregulation-
stupid/ [https://perma.cc/V3LE-NMWK] (noting that “‘regulation’ is no longer such 
a dirty word”). 
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regulatory agenda.35 In particular, the EPA sought to address 
significant air pollution problems that posed serious harms to public 
health, in some cases carrying out nondiscretionary statutory duties 
and in others exercising its discretion pursuant to congressional 
delegations.36 
Though responding to deregulatory tendencies of previous 
administrations was one motivation for the increase in regulatory 
activity under Obama, congressional gridlock provided another 
motivation.37 To respond to climate change and air pollution 
challenges, the Obama Administration initially pushed for a legislative 
solution with a cap-and-trade bill.38 A bill targeting greenhouse gas 
emissions passed in the House in 2009 with only eight Republican 
votes.39 Republicans, complaining about the high cost of the bill, had 
proposed over 400 amendments in the markup session.40 The fight in 
the Senate would prove to be even more difficult, as Democrats 
needed sixty votes to overcome a potential Republican filibuster.41 
While some Democrats from coal and oil states were unwilling to 
support a Democratic-sponsored bill, a more moderate, bipartisan 
version was unable to attract enough Republican votes to overcome a 
potential filibuster.42 In the end, no version of a cap-and-trade bill was 
brought to the floor of the Senate for a vote.43 Republicans, criticizing 
                                                   
 35. See Lipton, supra note 31 (stating the scale of rulemaking in the Obama 
Administration was higher than in the Clinton and Bush Administrations, according 
to several common metrics used to estimate aggregate regulatory volume); Reg Stats, 
GEO. WASH. UNIV. REG. STUD. CTR., https://regulatorystudies.columbian. 
gwu.edu/reg-stats [https://perma.cc/3GKU-69FD] (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). For 
example, 489 economically significant rules were promulgated across all agencies 
under Obama compared to 361 under Clinton and 358 under Bush. See Reg Stats, 
supra note 35.  
 36. See Thomas O. McGarity, Avoiding Gridlock Through Unilateral 
Executive Action: The Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, 7 WAKE FOREST 
J. L. & POL’Y 141, 149-52, 156-57, 163-64, 169-70, 173-74, 177-79, 188-89 (2017) 
(cataloguing the regulations promulgated by Obama’s EPA); The World in 
Microcosm, supra note 8.  
 37. See McGarity, supra note 36, at 198. 
 38. See ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE WAR: TRUE BELIEVERS, POWER 
BROKERS, AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE THE EARTH 326 (1st ed. 2010) (noting President 
Obama called for climate legislation in the form of a “market-based cap on carbon 
pollution” in his first address to Congress in 2009). 
 39. See McGarity, supra note 36, at 146.  
 40. See POOLEY, supra note 38, at 387-88; McGarity, supra note 36, at 145. 
 41. See McGarity, supra note 36, at 146-47. 
 42. See POOLEY, supra note 38, at 418-19; McGarity, supra note 36, at 146. 
 43. See With a Whimper, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/opinion/23fri1.html [https://perma.cc/WK5H-
VNQH]. 
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the environmental platform of the Obama Administration,44 won major 
victories in the 2010 midterm elections. Retaking the House and 
picking up six seats in the Senate, Republicans vowed to continue their 
efforts to block Obama’s agenda in Congress.45  
The day after the midterm elections, recognizing that a 
comprehensive legislative solution to tackle greenhouse gas emissions 
would likely be impossible, Obama observed that “[c]ap and trade was 
just one way of skinning the cat; it was not the only way.”46 In his 
second term, Obama would shift his focus from advocating for a 
legislative solution to combat greenhouse gas emissions to pushing 
EPA-promulgated regulations under existing statutory authority.47 
From the start of his first term, Obama’s EPA had already been 
active in promulgating rules to protect the environment, processing a 
backlog of court-ordered regulations dating back as long as twenty 
years.48 In its landmark decision Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, 
the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles 
qualified as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act and would be 
subject to regulation if the EPA made a finding that these emissions 
endangered human health and welfare.49 In 2009, the EPA issued the 
“[e]ndangerment [f]inding” (that greenhouse gas emissions from 
vehicles did indeed endanger human health and welfare)50 followed by 
rules that set out the plan to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
vehicle tailpipes and stationary sources.51 Another rule, the Mercury 
                                                   
 44. See Power, supra note 8. 
 45. See Dan Balz & William Branigin, After Midterm Wins, GOP Vows to 
Block Obama’s Agenda, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2010),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/ 
AR2010110207506.html?sid=ST2010110201489 [https://perma.cc/V6T7-4CCE]. 
 46. John M. Broder, Obama to Face New Foes in Global Warming 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/ 
business/energy-environment/04enviro.html [https://perma.cc/S9Z5-M7U5]. 
 47. See Peter Baker & Coral Davenport, Using Executive Powers, Obama 
Begins His Last Big Push on Climate Policy, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/politics/obama-sets-the-stage-for-curbing-
emissions.html [https://perma.cc/CMK7-AKBA]. 
 48. See The World in Microcosm, supra note 8. 
 49. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529, 533 (2007). 
 50. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 
1). 
 51. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
17,004, 17,019 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71) 
(announcing that vehicular greenhouse gas emissions standards would trigger 
stationary-source permitting requirements); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,396 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, et al.) (setting tailpipe emission 
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and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) rule, finalized at the end of 2011, 
was based on the results of a congressionally mandated study 
completed in 1997.52 Litigation initiated in 2008, which charged the 
EPA with a failure to fulfill a non-discretionary duty to act, was settled 
with a consent decree that set a deadline of December 16, 2011, for a 
notice of final rulemaking for what became the MATS rule.53 Yet 
another rule, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), originally 
published in 2011 (and subsequently updated), replaced the 2005 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which had been struck down 2008 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.54 
In his second term, President Obama more aggressively used his 
position as president to take a strong leadership role in setting the EPA 
agenda. In 2013, he announced an ambitious “Climate Action Plan” 
and ordered the EPA to publish notices of proposed rulemaking to 
combat greenhouse gas emissions.55 The EPA responded with several 
rules targeting the greenhouse gas emissions of power plants: the 
Clean Power Plan (CPP), which limits the carbon dioxide emissions 
of existing power plants,56 rules limiting the carbon dioxide emissions 
standards of new and modified power plants,57 and the methane 
emissions standards of new and modified oil and gas installations.58 
With these moves, President Obama explicitly embraced unilateral 
executive action to tackle climate change, calling it “a challenge that 
does not pause for partisan gridlock.”59 
                                                   
standards for vehicles); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, et al.) (laying out tailoring of stationary-source 
requirements to include greenhouse gas emission regulations). 
 52. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 9,304, 9,306 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
 53. See id. at 9,436. 
 54. See Federal Implementation Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,207, 48,211 (Aug. 8, 
2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, et al.). 
 55. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION 
PLAN 7 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/ 
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/77KS-L463]. 
 56. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60). 
 57. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64,510, 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, et al.). 
 58. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,825 (June 3, 
2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 59. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on Climate 
Change at Georgetown University (June 25, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change 
[https://perma.cc/TP5Y-MWEM]; see also Baker & Davenport, supra note 47. 
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III. DESIRABILITY OF REGULATORY ACTIVITY 
The third claim, that this development is undesirable as a matter 
of policy, is, according to the best analyses of costs and benefits of 
regulations, patently incorrect. Every regulatory impact analysis of 
recent, major air-quality regulations has shown that these regulations 
produce enormous net benefits (that is, benefits minus costs). Since 
1981, every president has had in place an Executive Order requiring 
that, except where otherwise provided for by statute, major federal 
regulations be justified by reference to cost-benefit analysis.60 The 
purpose is to allow for effective oversight of agency rulemaking to 
ensure that benefits of major rules justify their costs.61 In order to 
satisfy this requirement, agencies must perform regulatory impact 
analyses for major rules, subject to review by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).62 
In its 2017 summary of the costs and benefits of all major federal 
regulations for which costs and benefits had been estimated, the OMB 
reported aggregate benefits of between $287 and $911 billion and 
costs of only between $78 and $115 billion.63 Of these regulations, 
EPA rules account for over 80% of all monetized benefits—between 
$240 and $784 billion—and over 70% of all monetized costs—
between $65 and $85 billion.64 The EPA has also completed three 
comprehensive studies of the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act, 
with the most recent published in 2011.65 This prospective study, 
                                                   
 60. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011) 
(detailing the Executive Order from the Obama Administration); Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (detailing the Executive Order from the 
Clinton Administration); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981) 
(detailing the Executive Order from the Reagan Administration). 
 61. See Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency 
Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 616 (2014) (identifying the goals of centralized 
review of rulemaking with cost-benefit analysis as reducing information asymmetries 
and correcting for cognitive biases in agencies to improve the quality of regulation). 
 62. See id. at 610. 
 63. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 2 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TD9W-RURG]. 
 64. Id. at 10, 12. 
 65. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (2011) [hereinafter EPA, BENEFITS AND 
COSTS, 1990 TO 2020], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/ 
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covering the period from 1990 to 2020, projected that the statute 
would produce annual net benefits—benefits minus costs—of $1.9 
trillion by 2020.66 
Two rules, the MATS rule and the CPP, are good examples of 
the enormous net benefits that can accrue from environmental 
regulations. The regulatory impact analysis of MATS estimated net 
benefits of $27 to $80 billion.67 The CPP analysis estimated net 
benefits of $26 to $45 billion.68 Despite these enormous net benefits, 
both rules are being reconsidered by the Trump Administration.69  
These net benefits are so large because the rules save a large 
number of lives in addition to preventing serious health effects such 
as heart attacks, strokes, and asthma episodes. The prospective study 
of the Clean Air Act found that controlling air pollution prevented 
160,000 premature deaths in the United States in 2010, rising to 
230,000 deaths prevented annually by 2020.70 As a result, about two 
million American lives will be saved in the decade between 2010 and 
2020. Just one of these rules, CSAPR, which was upheld by the 
                                                   
documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf [https://perma.cc/M788-Q4W3]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 2010 (1999) 
[hereinafter EPA, BENEFITS AND COSTS, 1990 TO 2010], https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullrept.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGS6-
AENN]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT 1970 TO 1990 (1997) [hereinafter EPA, BENEFITS AND COSTS, 1970 TO 1990], 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/contsetc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TA4Y-N8QU]. 
 66. EPA, BENEFITS AND COSTS, 1990 TO 2020, supra note 65, at 7-9 tbl.7-5. 
 67. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE 
FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, at ES-2 tbl.ES-1 (2011),  
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RCK8-SKLC]. 
 68. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE 
CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at 8-3 tbl.8-1, 8-4 tbl.8-2 (2015),  
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-
existing-units_2015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R4C-FNG2]. 
 69. See State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,507 (proposed Dec. 28, 2017) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (giving an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
intended to solicit comments for possible replacement for the Clean Power Plan); 
Respondent EPA’s Motion to Continue Oral Argument at 1-4, Murray Energy Corp. 
v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2017) (requesting a continuance for oral 
argument to allow EPA to review the MATS rule).  
 70. EPA, BENEFITS AND COSTS, 1990 TO 2020, supra note 65, at 5-25 tbl.5-6 
(including statistics for adults thirty years old and older). 
 Congress and the Executive 809 
Supreme Court in a six to two vote,71 is predicted to prevent between 
13,000 and 34,000 premature deaths each year.72 
Systematizing and improving the methodology underlying cost-
benefit analyses to ensure regulations will actually benefit the 
American people has been an important push in administrative law in 
the last few decades, beginning with President Reagan issuing the first 
Executive Order to require a cost-benefit analysis for major 
regulations.73 In the case of these Clean Air Act regulations, all the 
available studies forcefully demonstrate that the benefits to the 
American people substantially outweigh the compliance costs for the 
affected industries. 
IV.  SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS 
The fourth claim—that what the agencies have done is an affront 
to separation of powers—is similarly without merit. To unpack this 
critique, it is helpful to distinguish two types of arguments that are 
leveled against the executive branch. The first type of argument 
criticizes the broad delegation of lawmaking power by Congress to 
administrative agencies.74 The second focuses on the increasing 
                                                   
 71. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 
(2014). 
 72. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE 
FINAL TRANSPORT RULE 3 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
07/documents/epa-hq-oar-2009-0491-4547.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4KE-JM77]. 
 73. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 24-29, 47-51 (2008). 
 74. See Christopher C. DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 128-33 (2016) (providing historical perspective on the 
development of the non-delegation doctrine); see also, e.g., Alexander Volokh, 
Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 
66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1393 (2017) (calling the nondelegation doctrine “notoriously 
lax” or even “kind of fictitious”); Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How 
Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1484 (2015) 
(arguing that delegation diminishes Congress as a body by empowering individual 
legislators to “pursue their personal interests apart from the legislative process”); Gary 
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002) (claiming 
that delegation “raises fundamental questions about democracy, accountability, and 
the enterprise of American governance”). Not all commentators agree that a strong 
nondelegation doctrine would be desirable or constitutionally justified. See, e.g., Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine “lacks any 
foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in 
sound economic and political theory”); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public 
Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 133 (2000) (contending 
that “[d]elegation is efficient in that it offers the opportunity for flexible, adaptive 
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importance of the personality of the president to shape and control 
policymaking, at the expense of Congress.75 While the first considers 
Congress’s role in giving up its power to agencies, the second 
considers the president’s role in seizing power through policy setting 
in or oversight of agencies.76 
Though recent criticism of the administrative state has become 
increasingly framed in constitutional terms,77 it is still laced with a 
presumption that there is too much federal regulation—that the federal 
government is too large and does too much.78 However, most 
                                                   
policymaking” and that the nondelegation doctrine “seems to promote form over 
substance”). 
 75. See, e.g., DeMuth, supra note 74, at 151-52 (describing executive branch 
decision-making under President Obama, especially with his personal involvement, 
as “sheer unilateralism”); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 
236 (2015) (describing the ability of the President to pool administrative powers from 
different agencies as “hold[ing] special promise for the executive in times of polarized 
and divided government”); Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy 
and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2583 (2011) 
(claiming that President Obama’s “proliferation of high-profile czars is his particular 
instantiation of a policy, common to all modern Presidents, of seeking to magnify his 
control over agency action”); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (arguing 
presidential supervision of agencies is lawful, but exercise of decisional authority is 
not); see also supra Part II. Again, not all commentators denounce executive 
unilateralism as undesirable or unlawful. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
769, 774 (2013) (supporting the legal authority of the President to subject all agencies, 
including independent agencies, to regulatory review); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (defending the use of 
presidential directives to agencies). 
 76. See DeMuth, supra note 74, at 128-33, 151-52. 
 77. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 1-4 (2017) 
(noting that “[o]ver the past century, most complaints about administrative power 
have come from an economic perspective,” before introducing a legal challenge to 
administrative power); Metzger, supra note 1, at 9 (observing that the “striking 
feature” of present challenges is that they are “framed in terms of constitutional 
doctrine”). 
 78. See, e.g., DeMuth, supra note 74, at 173 (claiming that “the removal of 
limits on Congress’s legislative powers and on its ability to delegate those 
powers . . . produces too much law”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 402 (2015) (noting that some 
current critiques of the administrative state espouse a libertarian view that the 
Constitution should protect property rights and economic rights from governmental 
intrusion); Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 193, 194 (2011) (arguing that two pillars of the Tea Party are that the 
text of the Constitution contains “the solutions to the problems facing the United 
States today” and that “the overarching purpose of the Constitution is to ensure that 
the role of government . . . is a limited one”); Spence & Cross, supra note 74, at 99 
(considering seminal early public choice scholarship that implied that, because 
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commentators, including many critics, admit that in our modern 
society some level of congressional delegation and executive branch 
regulation—including regulation to protect the environment and 
public health—is desirable and constitutionally permissible.79  
Though there have been significant nondelegation challenges to 
the Clean Air Act, the law and the rulemaking framework it establishes 
for the EPA have been repeatedly upheld by courts. In 1999, the D.C. 
Circuit considered a direct constitutional challenge to a provision of 
the Clean Air Act on nondelegation grounds.80 Though the D.C. 
Circuit held that the provision, as interpreted by the EPA, lacked a 
sufficient “intelligible principle” and was therefore an 
unconstitutional delegation,81 the Supreme Court reversed.82 Justice 
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, conceded that a “certain degree 
of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or 
judicial action,” thereby sanctioning the fundamental constitutional 
framework of legislative delegation to administrative agencies.83 
Regarding the EPA’s first efforts to regulate greenhouse gases, which 
came before the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, opponents 
argued that the EPA was overstepping its statutory authority because 
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act of 1970 to address local pollutants 
and not global pollutants like greenhouse gases.84 However, when 
                                                   
interest groups dominated government decision making, “less government might be 
better government”).  
 79. See CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET 
FAILURE 42 (2006) (noting that “externalities have caused serious social problems 
justifying government intervention”); Metzger, supra note 1, at 15 (observing that 
new efforts to dismantle the administrative state are unlikely to succeed and that 
“[a]dministrative government’s endurance reflects basic political as well as economic, 
social, and technological realities”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Assessing the 
Administrative State, 32 J.L. & POL. 239, 242 (2017) (highlighting that the 
administrative state “arose out of a deeply felt need to respond to economic crises, 
intransigent forms of discrimination, and threats to public health and safety—a set of 
problems that were more complex, more challenging, and more pressing than anything 
the country had seen before”); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 881 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD 
L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008) and 
observing that “there is little academic disagreement about the need for regulation,” 
including environmental regulation). 
 80. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), rev’d sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 81. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
 82. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486. 
 83. Id. at 475. But see id. at 486-87 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
there are cases where “the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great” 
for Congress to delegate even with an “intelligible principle”). 
 84. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007). 
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Congress passed the law in 1970, it decided not to exhaustively name 
the particular pollutants that should be regulated, instead delegating to 
the EPA the determination of what qualified as an “air pollutant” for 
the purposes of the statute, responding as new scientific evidence 
emerged.85 Applying the statutory definition of “air pollutant” in this 
case, the Court held that greenhouse gases are air pollutants for the 
purposes of the Clean Air Act.86 Notably, the decision in this case set 
aside an EPA determination not to regulate greenhouse gases,87 so the 
claim of agency overreach in regulating greenhouse gases is 
particularly puzzling. 
EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions following 
Massachusetts v. EPA hardly seems like a poster child for executive 
branch overreach. The EPA needed to determine whether greenhouse 
gases, which the Supreme Court had determined to be an air pollutant, 
posed a danger to public health and welfare.88 And, after the 
endangerment finding, the agency needed to set an appropriate safety 
standard.89 The endangerment finding and rules that set appropriate 
safety standards are technical, fact-intensive determinations that fall 
comfortably within the expertise of the EPA. Whether the limit for an 
                                                   
 85. See John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and 
Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42 (1997) (describing how “[t]he 
Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to add or remove pollutants on its own or in response 
to a petition from any person”). The specific statutory authority at issue in this case 
reads:  
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time 
revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards 
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of 
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment 
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare. 
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). The Clean Air Act defines the term “air pollutant” 
broadly: “The term ‘air pollutant’ means any air pollution agent or combination of 
such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including 
source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter 
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) 
(2012). In the opinion, the Court argues that while the drafting Congress “might not 
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, 
they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and 
scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete.” 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532.  
 86. See id. at 528-29 (“On its face, the definition embraces all airborne 
compounds of whatever stripe . . . . The statute is unambiguous.”). 
 87. See id. at 534-35 (finding that the “EPA has offered no reasoned 
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to 
climate change”). 
 88. See § 7521(a)(1). 
 89. See id. 
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air pollutant should be eight parts per million or ten parts per million, 
for example, is not the kind of decision Congress is well-suited to 
make. Not only would the substance of regulation likely suffer, but 
forcing Congress to make technical decisions like this would 
significantly add to its workload, distracting from other legislation 
Congress might focus on instead. Again, if we accept the proposition 
that some congressional delegation of rulemaking authority is 
desirable and constitutionally permissible, delegating to the EPA the 
authority to set standards to control air pollutants under the Clean Air 
Act is an eminently reasonable and uncontroversial delegation.  
Turning then to the second critique—that the power of the 
president has eclipsed that of Congress, resulting in strong, unilateral 
agenda-setting by the president, including through policy setting at 
administrative agencies—there seems to be fairly broad consensus on 
the general diagnosis of the current power dynamic between Congress 
and the president.90 However, just because the president’s individual 
significance has grown in the government does not mean that the 
exercise of executive power or that agency decision-making are 
legally unaccountable. Though President Obama urged his EPA to 
initiate new regulations to protect the environment, the EPA had to act 
within its statutory authority and follow the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).91 On the other side of the ideological spectrum, deregulatory 
actions taken by President Trump’s EPA are being scrutinized in the 
courts for their conformity with statutory mandates and APA 
procedures as well.92 In both the Obama and Trump Administrations, 
the requirement for reasoned decision-making under the APA has 
provided a legitimate check on untethered presidential policy-making 
                                                   
 90. Compare DeMuth, supra note 74, at 173 (describing the “current 
freewheeling unilateralism” of executive government in America, in the context of a 
critique of expansive executive branch power), with ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 32-33 
(2010) (agreeing that the executive is largely unconstrained by Congress but arguing 
that our government is better off as a result). 
 91. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) 
(holding that the “EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted the Clean 
Air Act to require . . . permitting for stationary sources based on their greenhouse-gas 
emissions”); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1600 (2014) 
(holding, for the CSAPR, that the EPA adhered to statutorily mandated deadlines 
under the Clear Air Act and that a failure to promulgate a rule by the deadline would 
have violated the statute). 
 92. See Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, In His Haste to Roll Back Rules, 
Scott Pruitt, EPA Chief, Risks His Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/climate/scott-pruitt-epa-rollbacks.html 
[https://perma.cc/DDS4-TUBB]. 
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and has promoted respect for congressional will and the text of the 
Clean Air Act.93 
V. A MORE ROBUST CONGRESSIONAL ROLE? 
Fifth, the current calls for congressional action are not efforts to 
improve regulatory policy or, for that matter, to deal with any 
separation of powers problems. Instead, they are part of a concerted 
campaign, motivated by a myopic focus on reducing compliance costs, 
to put an end to the protections that save so many lives and produce 
such large net benefits. This strategy is clear from the bills that have 
been introduced in the recent Congresses. 
The proposed Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA) (the most 
recent version of which passed in the House in 2017 but not the 
Senate) would increase the procedural formality required for 
rulemaking.94 The RAA would make it easy for the regulated 
community to obtain a trial-like hearing for significant rules and 
essentially turn notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is currently 
used to promulgate virtually all significant regulations,95 into formal 
rulemaking.96 This is not a recipe to improve the quality of agency 
                                                   
 93. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2449 (holding that Obama’s 
EPA exceeded its statutory authority); Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that Trump’s EPA, in reconsidering a rule, acted in an 
“arbitrary and capricious” way in violation of the APA). 
 94. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 95. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 936 
(2008) (presenting empirical data that shows notice-and-comment rulemaking is the 
predominant mechanism of rulemaking for many agencies). A few agencies rely less 
heavily on notice-and-comment rulemaking, such as the Department of Defense and 
the State Department, which are largely exempted from the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements, and the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, which rely on emergency rationales for interim 
rulemaking, which are similarly exempt from notice-and-comment requirements. See 
id. at 935. The EPA, by contrast, relies almost exclusively on notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. See id. 
 96. See John Conyers, Jr. et al., The Dangers of Legislating Based on 
Mythology: The Serious Risks Presented by the Anti-Regulatory Agenda of the 115th 
Congress and the Trump Administration, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 365, 383-84 (2017) 
(criticizing the proposal as an attempt to revive “formal rulemaking”); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., A Good Effort, with One Glaring Flaw, REG. REV. (May 8, 
2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/08/pierce-good-effort-glaring-
flaw/ [https://perma.cc/V6L5-Y4U7] (criticizing the public hearing provision of the 
RAA, which could be triggered in more than 100 agency rulemakings a year, as “a 
variant of ‘formal rulemaking’”); James Goodwin, Anything but Moderate: The 
Senate Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, CPRBLOG (May 2, 2017), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=B6B0B417-E50E-5626-
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decision-making. It is, instead, a recipe to significantly delay and 
perhaps defeat action of any kind.97 Formal rulemaking has few 
defenders in the legal academy,98 as it was widely held to be 
unworkable by the time it was effectively interred in the 1973 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway 
Company.99 The roadblock imposed by formal rulemaking was 
encapsulated in the infamous “peanut butter rule,” in which it took 
over ten years to determine whether peanut butter should consist of 
87% or 90% peanuts.100 
Another proposed bill, the Regulations from the Executive in 
Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act of 2017,101 would be similarly 
cumbersome and would similarly stand in the way of the promulgation 
of socially beneficial regulations.102 The REINS Act would require all 
                                                   
FCB79F4E27E24532 [https://perma.cc/ZEJ9-6JGY] (criticizing the requirement for 
formal, trial-like procedures in the RAA as exclusionary to the public due to 
requirements for legal counsel). 
 97. See Letter from Forty-Two Admin. Law Professors, to Lamar Smith, 
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, Comm. 
on the Judiciary (Oct. 24, 2011), http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/LawReg111024.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ38-
5AQB] (describing a “consensus of the administrative law community that the APA 
formal rulemaking procedure is unworkable and obsolete”); Am. Bar Ass’n Section 
of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, Comments on H.R. 3010, The 
Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 619, 626 (2012) (noting 
that formal rulemaking has been “long-discredited” and that trial-like procedures are 
ill-suited for legislative decision-making); William Funk, Requiring Formal 
Rulemaking Is a Thinly Veiled Attempt to Halt Regulation, REG. REV. (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/18/funk-formal-rulemaking-halt-regulation/ 
[https://perma.cc/CH3K-Y7ZP] (highlighting that “the U.S. Supreme Court, scholars, 
policy makers, and other interested parties all have condemned formal rulemaking”). 
 98. See generally Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (2014) (describing the general academic consensus that formal 
rulemaking is obsolete, while arguing for limited adoption of more formal procedures 
in narrow circumstances). 
 99. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1973) 
(holding that the statutory language in the case was insufficient to trigger formal 
rulemaking under the APA). This holding made it easy for agencies to avoid formal 
rulemaking in the context of statutes that were not exactly tailored to the language of 
the APA. Congress also demurred from insisting on formal rulemaking in subsequent 
legislation. 
 100. See Peanut Butter, Definition and Standard of Identity; Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions, and Final Order, 33 Fed. Reg. 10,506 (July 24, 1968). The rule was 
upheld by the Third Circuit two years later, bringing the total time from initial 
proposal to the court decision to over ten years. See generally Corn Prods. Co. v. FDA, 
427 F.2d 511 (1970). 
 101. See Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, 
H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 102. See INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, THE REINS ACT IS BURDENSOME, 
IRRATIONAL, AND LEGALLY QUESTIONABLE 2 (2017), http://policyintegrity.org/ 
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major regulations to be approved by both houses of Congress and 
signed by the president before going into effect.103 If Congress failed 
to act, the agency would be barred from promulgating a related rule 
for the duration of that session.104 Congress would effectively have the 
power to veto regulation through inaction.  
Congress has neither the time nor relevant expertise to 
effectively review complicated regulations—the safety standard of an 
air pollutant requisite to protect human health, for example—which 
can take years to formulate through the notice-and-comment process. 
The REINS Act would not only greatly hamper the ability of agencies 
to promulgate rules, it would also incentivize gridlock in Congress for 
any member promoting an anti-regulatory agenda: If merely delaying 
a congressional vote on a regulation would be enough to kill that and 
any similar regulation, obstruction becomes as powerful as, and 
significantly easier than, passing a law limiting agency authority. 
Additionally, even if Congress does vote to authorize the rule, 
the REINS Act would not prevent subsequent legal challenges on 
administrative law grounds.105 The Act specifically provides that 
congressional authorization of a rule would not affect the substantive 
standard of review by the courts.106 In effect, the procedure of 
congressional approval in the REINS Act would not even confer the 
benefit of finality that congressional action normally would. 
There is no doubt that some forms of congressional action could 
be desirable. For example, while the EPA has the authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, as the Supreme Court 
                                                   
files/publications/Senate_REINS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HDM-J9RN] (noting not 
only the burden the REINS Act would place on Congress, but also that it would 
empower special interests to block regulation); Ronald M. Levin, The REINS Act: 
Unbridled Impediment to Regulation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1455 (2015) 
(noting that in 2010 the House had only 116 legislative days while the REINS Act 
then being considered would have required more than 100 regulations to be reviewed); 
Metzger, supra note 1, at 12-13 (arguing that the difficulty Congress has had in 
passing legislation in recent years would mean the REINS Act would effectively block 
major regulation). 
 103. See H.R. 26 §§ 801, 802. 
 104. See id. § 801(a)(5). 
 105. See id. § 805(c). 
 106. See id. § 805(c). Section 805(c) reads:  
The enactment of a joint resolution of approval under section 802 shall not 
be interpreted to serve as a grant or modification of statutory authority by 
Congress for the promulgation of a rule, shall not extinguish or affect any 
claim, whether substantive or procedural, against any alleged defect in a 
rule, and shall not form part of the record before the court in any judicial 
proceeding concerning a rule except for purposes of determining whether 
or not the rule is in effect. 
Id.; see also Levin, supra note 102, at 1462. 
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recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA,107 doing so through regulation is 
cumbersome and suboptimal. For example, § 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act, under which the EPA promulgated the Clean Power Plan, 
probably requires the EPA to proceed sector by sector, with one 
regulation for power plants, another one for oil and gas installations, 
yet another one for refineries, and so on.108 And each state must draw 
up plans to show how the requirements of each rule would be met in 
that state.109 As a result, it is difficult to benefit from inter-sector and 
inter-state trading options, which could significantly reduce the costs 
of greenhouse gas reductions. Legislation, in contrast, could be 
designed to achieve this objective. And the regulatory process is 
cumbersome and open to protracted judicial challenges, which 
legislation would avoid. But constructive congressional action of this 
sort seems unlikely in the current political climate. 
VI. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION’S DISREGARD FOR COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
This brings me to my final, deep concern. Since 1981, 
administrations of both parties have determined that regulations 
should be justified by reference to cost-benefit analysis.110 This 
requirement has served us well until recently. As discussed with the 
example of the enormous net-benefits of the Clean Air Act, the proof 
is in the pudding.111 
But now, the Trump Administration has mounted an attack on 
cost-benefit analysis across a number of different regulatory areas. 
First, President Trump’s Executive Order 13,771 requires a cap on 
costs, suggesting that the goal is to minimize overall regulatory costs, 
not to maximize the net benefits of regulation.112 Any respected 
economist would cringe at this one-sidedness.113 It would be absurd 
                                                   
 107. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); see also supra text 
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for the economic analysis of policy to ignore the deaths averted, the 
reduced number of hospitalizations, the morbidity reductions, and 
other significant decreases in the well-being of Americans. 
Second, the Trump Administration has justified a number of its 
efforts to delay, stay, or suspend Obama Administration regulations 
by reference only to the cost savings to regulated industries, without 
looking at the forgone benefits to the regulatory beneficiaries.114 On 
this front, the Trump Administration has already suffered significant 
losses in the courts,115 but these actions, even if ultimately 
unsuccessful, are revealing of the Administration’s mind-set. 
Third, the proposed repeals of Obama Administration 
regulations do violence to cost-benefit analysis. For example, in the 
proposed repeal to the Clean Power Plan, the EPA analyzes a scenario 
under which the co-benefits (or indirect benefits) of the regulation are 
not taken into account, even though the agency urges more extensive 
consideration of the indirect costs of regulation.116 To take into account 
the indirect negative consequences of regulation but ignore the 
positive ones is the very embodiment of “arbitrary and capricious” 
conduct. 
The era in which congressional gridlock was counteracted by 
agencies acting under authority delegated to them by existing statutes 
and generally guided by cost-benefit analysis brought Americans 
enormous net benefits, greatly enhancing our well-being.117 We have 
much cleaner air and water and much safer workplaces and consumer 
products.118 And the American economy has grown significantly in the 
period when all this happened. Unfortunately, we now appear to be 
entering a time when this desirable state of affairs is at risk. But the 
courts have the tools they need to ensure that agencies, in their zeal to 
                                                   
281, 284-91 (2018) (summarizing the traditional economic rationale for cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 114. See Lydia DePillis, The Real Story of Trump’s Crusade to Cut 
Government Red Tape, CNN BUSINESS (June 5, 2018, 7:41 AM), https://money. 
cnn.com/2018/06/05/news/economy/trump-executive-order-red-tape/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/L5JB-3U23]. 
 115. See generally Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 116. See Kimberly M. Castle & Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Standards, 
Thresholds, and the Next Battleground of Climate Change Regulations, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2-3) (on file with author); Richard L. Revesz, 
Pruitt Would Like Us to Ignore the Indirect Benefits of Environmental Regulations, 
SLATE (June 13, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://slate.com/ 
technology/2018/06/scott-pruitt-is-trying-to-undermine-environmental-regulation-
in-a-creative-way.html [https://perma.cc/MB3J-M64E]. 
 117. See supra Part I (explaining the era of successful congressional gridlock). 
 118. See supra Part III (discussing the studies that show the benefits of clear 
air regulations). 
 Congress and the Executive 819 
deregulate, do not violate the rationality requirements embodied in the 
APA and well-established doctrines of administrative law. 
